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Santa Clara University School of Law
Copyright 1994 by Matthew Bender & Company.
Reprinted with permission from the California Criminal Trial Guide,
to be published Fall, 1994. All rights reserved.
I. Statutory Authority

[Evidence Code Section 1010-1027]
II. Constitutional Protection for
Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege
ill. Rationale
N.Exceptions to PsychotherapistPatient Privilege
A. Matters bearing directly on the
emotional or mental condition of
the defendant voluntarily
disclosed by the patient.
B. Psychotherapist appointed by
order of the court.
C. Proceeding initiated at the
request of the defendant to
determine his sanity to be tried,
his sentence, or punishment.
D. Communication made in aid of
the commission of a crime or tort
or to escape apprehension of a
crime or tort.
E. Dangerous person exception
F. Patient under age of 16 and the
psychotherapist has reason to
believe that he/she has been the
victim of a crime.
G. Child Abuse an Neglect Prevention Act

I. STATUTORY AI/1HORITY

The Evidence Code has a number of
sections which apply to the psychotherapist-patient privilege. These sections are
organized as follows:
Evidence Code Section 1014 states
and defines the privilege.
Evidence Code Sections 1010-1012
define the crucial terms of psychotherapist (1010), patient (1011) and confidential communication (1012).
Evidence Code sections 1013and 1015
address the assertion of the privilege by
26

defining the "holder of the privilege
(1013) and describing when the psyche>therapist must claim the privilege (1015).
Evidence Code Sections 1016-1027 set
out the exceptions under which the privilege will not apply.
Eyidence Code section 1010 (Psyche>therapist Defined) states:
As used in this article, "psychotherapist" means:
(a) A person authorized, pr reasonably believed by the patient to be
authorized, to practice medicine in
any state or nation who devotes, or
is reasonably believed by the patient to devote, a substantial portion of his or her time to the practice of psychiatry.
(b) A person licensed as a psychole>-

gist under Chapter 6.6 (commencing with Section 2900) of Division
2 of the Business and Professions
Code.
(c) A person licensed as a clinical se>cial worker under Article 4 (commencing with Section 9040) of
Chapter 17 of Division 3 of the
Business and Professions Code,
when he or she is engaged in applied psychotherapy of a
nonmedical nature.
(d)A person who is serving as a
school psychologist and holds a
credential authorizing such service issued by the state.
(e) A person licensed as a marriage,
family and child counselor under
Chapter 13 (commencing with
Section 4980) of Division 2 of the

Business and Professions Code.
(I) A person registered as a psycho-

logical assistant who is under the
supervision of a licensed psychologist or board certified psychiatrist as required by Section
2913 of the Business and Professions Code, or a person registered
as a marriage, family and child
counselor intern who is under the
supervision of a licensed marriage,
family and child counselor, a licensed clinical social worker, a licensed psychologist, or a licensed
physician certified in psychiatry,
as specified in Section 4980.44 of
the Business and Professions
Code.

(g) A person registered as an associate
clinical social worker who is under
the supervision of a licensed clinical social worker, a licensed psychologist, or a board certified psychiatrist as required by Section
4996.20 of the Business and ProfessionsCode.
(h) A person exempt from the Psychology Licensing Law pursuant
to subdivision (d) of Section 2909
of the Business and Professions
Code.
(i) A psychological intern as defined

in Section 2911 of the Business and
Professions Code.

(j) A trainee, as defined in subdivision
(c) of Section 4980.03 of the Business and Professions Code, who is
fulfilling his or her supervised
practicum required by subdivi2nd & 3rd Quarters, 1994
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sion (b) of Section 4980.40 of the

tion or the accomplishment of the

to those patients. The word "persons" as

Business and Professions Code.

purpose for which the psychothera-

used in this subdivision includes part-

pist is consulted, and includes a diagnosis made and the advice given

nerships, corporations, associations and

(k) There is no privilege under subdivisions (h), (i), and (j) in any criminal proceeding.
Evidence Code section 1010.5 (Application of Privilege to Educational Psy-

by the psychotherapist in the course
of that relationship.
Evidence Code section 1013 (Holder
of Privilege Defined) states:

chologist) states:
As used in this article, "holder of the
A communication between a patient
and an educational psychologist, licensed under Article 5 (commencing with Section 4986) of Chapter 13

of Division 2 of the Business and
Professions Code, shall be privileged to the same extent, and subject
to the same limitations, as a communication between a patient and a
psychotherapist described in subdivisions (c), (d), and (e) of Section
1010.
Evidence Code section 1011 (Patient
Defined) states:
As used in this article, "patient"
means a person who consults a psychotherapist or submits to an examination by a psychotherapist for the
purpose of securing a diagnosis or
preventive, palliative, or curative

(a) The patient when he has no guardian or conservator.
(b) A guardian or conservator of the
patient when the patient has a
guardian or conservator.
(c) The personal representative of the
patient if the patient is dead.

Evidence Code section 1014 (Who
May Claim Privilege) states:
Subject to Section 912 and except as
otherwise provided in this article,
the patient, whether or not a party,
has a privilege to refuse to disclose,
and to prevent another from disclosing, a confidential communication
between patient and psychothera-

pist if the privilege is claimed by:

treatment of his mental or emotional

(a) The holder of the privilege;

condition or who submits to an examination of his mental or emotional condition for the purpose of
scientific research on mental or emotional problems.

(b) A person who is authorized to

Evidence Code section 1012 (Confidential Communication Between Patient

and Psychotherapist Defined) states:
As used in this article, confidential
communication between patient
and psychotherapist" means information, including information obtained by an examination of the patient, transmitted between a patient
and his psychotherapist in the
course of that relationship and in
confidence by a means which, so far
as the patient is aware, discloses the
information to no third persons
other than those who are present to
further the interest of the patient in
the consultation, or those to whom
disclosure is reasonably necessary
for the transmission of the infonnaJf
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privilege" means:

claim the privilege by the holder of
the privilege; or
(c) The person who was the psychotherapist at the time of the confidential communication, but such
person may not claim the privilege
if there is no holder of the privilege
in existence or if he is otherwise
instructed by a person authorized
to permit disclosure.

The relationship of a psychotherapist
and patient shall exist between a psychological corporation as defined in Article 9
(commencing with Section 2995) of
Chapter 6.6 of Division 2 of the Business
and Professions Code or a licensed clinical social workers corporation as defined
in Article 5 (commencing with Section

other groups and entities.

Evidence Code section 1014.5 (Treatment of Minor by Psychotherapist)
states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, with respect to situations in which a minor has requested and been given mental
health treatment or counseling pursuant to Section 25.9 of the Civil
Code, the professional person ren-

dering such mental health treatment
or counseling has the psychotherapist privilege.

Evidence Code section 1015 (When
Psychotherapist Must Claim Privilege)
states:
The psychotherapist who received
or made a communication subject to

the privilege under this article shall
claim the privilege whenever he is
present when the communication is

sought to be disclosed and is authorized to claim the privilege under

subdivision (c) of Section 1014.
Evidence Code section 1016 (Condition of Patient in Issue) states:
There is no privilege under this article as to a communication relevant
to an issue concerning the mental or
emotional condition of the patient if
such issue has been tendered by:

(a) The patient;
(b) Any party claiming through or
under the patient;
(c) Any party claiming as a beneficiary of the patient through a contract to which the patient is or was
a party; or
(d) The plaintiff in an action brought
under Section 376 or 377 of the
Code of Civil Procedure for damages for the injury or death of the
patient.

4998) of Chapter 14 of Division 2 of the
Business and Professions Code, and the
patient to whom it renders professional
services, as well as between those pa-

Evidence Code section 1017 (Appointed Psychotherapist) states:

tients and psychotherapists employed

(a) There is no privilege under this
article if the psychotherapist is ap-

by those corporations to render services

27
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pointed by order of a court to examine the patient, but this exception does not apply where the psychotherapist is appointed by order
olthe court upon the request of the
lawyer for the defendant in a
criminal proceeding in order to
provide the lawyer with information needed so that he or she may
advise the defendant whether to
enter or withdraw a plea based on
insanity or to present a defense
based on his or her mental or emotional condition.
(b) There is no privilege under this
article if the psychotherapist is appointed by the Board of Prison
Terms to examine a patient pursuant to the provisions of Article 4
(commencing with Section 2960)
of Chapter 7 of Title I of Part 3 of
the Penal Code.

Evidence Code section 1018 (Services
of Psychotherapist Sought to Aid in
Commission of Crime or Tort or to Escape) states:
There is no privilege under this article if the services of the psychotherapist were sought or obtained to
enable or aid anyone to commit or
plan to commit a crime or a tort or to
escape detection or apprehension
after the commission of a crime or
tort.

Evidence Code section 1019 (Parties
Claiming Under Deceased Patient)
states:
There is no privilege under this article as to a communication relevant
to an issue between parties all of
whom claim through a deceased
patient, regardless of whether the
claims are by testate or intestate succession or by inter vivos transaction.

Evidence Code section 1020 (Breach
of Duty Arising Out of PsychotherapistPatient Relationship in Issue) states:
There is no privilege under this article as to a communication relevant
to an issue of breach, by the psychotherapist or by the patient, of a duty
arising out of the psychotherapistpatient relationship.
28
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Evidence Code section 1021 (Intention of Deceased Patient With Respect to
Writing Affecting Interest in Property in
Issue) states:
There is no privilege under this article as to a communication relevant
to an issue concerning the intention
of a patient, now deceased, with respect to a deed of conveyance, will,
or other writing, executed by the
patient, purporting to affect an interest in property.

Evidence Code section 1022 (Validity
of Writing Executed by Deceased Patient
Affecting Interest in Property in Issue)
states:
There is no privilege under this article as to a communication relevant
to an issue concerning the validity of
a deed of conveyance, will, or other
writing, executed by a patient, now
deceased, purporting to affect an
interest in property.

Evidence Code section 1023 (Proceeding in Criminal Action to Determine Sanity) states:

Evidence Code section 1026 (Information Required to be Reported or Recorded by Psychotherapist) states:
There is no privilege under this article as to information that the psychotherapist or the patient is required to report to a public employee or as to information required
to be recorded in a public office, if
such report or record is open to public inspection.

Evidence Code section 1027 (Circumstances for No Privilege) states:
There is no privilege under this article if all of the following circumstances exist:

(a) The patient is a child under the age
ofl6.
(b) The psychotherapist has reasonable cause to believe that the patient has been a victim of a crime
and that disclosure is in the best
interest of the child.

II. CONSmunONAL PROTECTION FOR

There is no privilege under this article in a proceeding under Chapter
6 (commencing with Section 1367)
ofTitie 10 of Part 2 of the Penal Code
initiated at the request of a defendant in a criminal proceeding to determine his sanity.

Evidence Code section 1024 (Dangerous Patient) states:
There is no privilege under this article if the psychotherapist has reasonable cause to believe that the patient is in such mental or emotional
condition as to be dangerous to himself or to the person or property of
another and that disclosure of the
communication is necessary to
present the threatened danger.

Evidence Code section 1025 (Proceeding to Establish Competence) states:
There is no privilege under this article in a proceeding brought by or
on behalf of the patient to establish
his competence.

PSYCHOTHERAPIST.pAnENT PRIVILEGE

The confidentiality of communications between patients and their psychotherapists does not depend solely on the
statutory psychotherapist-patient privilege created by the Evidence Code.
These communications are also protected by the constitutional right of privacy under the federal and state constitutions. Scull v. Superior Court (1988) 206
Cal. App. 3d 784, 790,254 Cal. Rptr. 24. In
California a citizens right to privacy is
independently protected under Article I,
section 1 of the California constitution.
The court in In re: Lifschutz (1970) 2 Cal.
3d 415,423,85 Cal. Rptr. 829, 467P.2d 557
concluded that any compelled disclosure
of a confidential communication involves the constitutional right to privacy
of the patient, and not of the psychotherapist.
Although no cases indicate that the
statutory privilege is any narrower than
what the constitution would demand,
the attorney should be alert to the applicability of constitutional right to privacy
cases in arguing whether or not a confidential, psychotherapist-patient com2nd & 3rd Quarters, 1994
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munication should be protected from
disclosure in a given situation. Counsel

objecting to the disclosure should always
raise the constitutional violation as an
independent basis for the objection as
well as the violation of the statutory
privilege. An error by the court on a constitutional issue has different implications in the standard of review on appeal.
The importance of the Constitutional

right to privacy is clear when Proposition
lIS attempted to amend the constitutional right to privacy for criminal defendants. The California Supreme Court

struck down that portion of the proposition holding that it "contemplates such a
far-reaching change in our governmental
framework as to amount to a qualitative
constitutional revision, an undertaking
beyond the reach of the initiative pro-

cess". Raven v. Deukmejian (1990) 52
Cal. 3d 336, 276 Cal. Rptr. 326.

III. RATIONALE

DEFENDER

though it is recognized that the

granting of the privilege may operate in particular cases to withhold
relevant information, the interests of

society will be better served if psychiatrists are able to assure patients
that their confidences will be pro-

tected.

gists as well as a host of other persons
who are enumerated in Evidence Code
Section 1010. This statutory privilege is
based upon the premise "that certain

forms of anti-social behavior may be prevented by encouraging those in need of
treatment for emotional problems to secure the services of a psychotherapist".

Scull v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.
App. 3d 784, 788, 254 Cal. Rptr. 24. In Re:
Lifschutz (1970) 2 Cal. 3d 415, 434-435, 85
Cal. Rptr. 829, 467 P. 2d 557.
The Law Revision Commission observed the need for insuring the confidential nature of this relationship and

whether a psychotherapist-patient relationship existed at the time that the state-

refuse to disclose, and to prevent others
from disclosing, a confidential commu-

nication between the patient and his/her
psychotherapist. Evidence Code Section
1014. The privilege can be claimed by the
holder of the privilege, a person authorized to claim the privilege by the holder,
or the psychotherapist. Evidence Code
Section 1013. The psychotherapist must
claim the privilege whenever he or she is
present when the communication is

sought to be disclosed and is authorized
to claim the privilege. Evidence Code
Section lOIS.
The Assembly Committee on Judition 405 clearly states that the "burden of
proof is on the objeciing party to show
that a privilege is applicable". Therefore,
if the disputed preliminary fact is

ments were made, the burden of proof is

into evidence.

on the party asserting the privilege to
convince the judge of the existence of the
relationship.

The court analogized the psychotherapist-patient privilege to the attorney-client privilege and looked at

The Legislative Committee to Evi-

whether the letter was an attempt to es-

dence Code Section 1014 states in pertinent part:
This article has created a psychotherapist-patient privilege that provides much

tablish the psychotherapist-patient relationship or if the relationship was already clearly established.
If the relationship is not clearly established, the privilege is to be strictly con-

broader protection than the physician

patient privilege.

psychiatrists because the confidentiality of their communications can-

the attorney-client privilege to promote

should apply to both psychiatrist and
certified psychologists. Psychoanalysis
and psychotherapy are dependent upon

not be assured ... Many of these per-

the fullest revelation of the most intimate

details of the patients life. Unless a pa-

the community. Accordingly, ... [the

such information can and will be held in
utmost confidence, he will be reluctant to

Volume 6, Number 2 & 3
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The Senate Judiciary Committee
comment stated "A broad privilege

sons are seriously disturbed and
constitute threats to other persons in
evidence code now] establishes a
new privilege that grants to patients
of psychiatrists a privilege much
broader in scope than the ordinary
physician patient privilege. AI-

strued, but where the relationship has

been established, the basic policy behind

observed:
persons in need of treatment sometimes refuse such treatment from

in partirular cases to withhold relevant
information, the interests of society will

be better served if psychiatrists are able
to assure patients that their confidences
will be protected.
InPeoplev. Cabral (1993) 12 Cal. App.
4th 820, IS Cal. Rptr. 2d 866, the defendant was convicted of rape, sodomy, and
continuous sexual abuse of a child. After
appellant was taken into custody he
wrote a letter to a psychotherapist at the
Stanislaus County Adult Sex Offender
Treatment Program. In the letter the appellantstated he "had sexually molested
his daughter and that he want[edj to be
in the ... program." Appellant testified
that he wrote the letter "in hope of getting county time, going through some
program, getting probation just like
these other gentlemen and going back
home to my family". 12 Cal. App. 4th at
824, IS Cal. Rptr. 2d at 868.
Arguing that this letter was protected
by the psychotherapist-patient privilege
appellant contended that the court committed prejudicial error in admitting it

Generally a patient, whether or not a

party in a proceeding, has a privilege to

ciary Comment to Evidence Code Sec-

The psychotherapist-patient privilege extends to psychiatrists, psycholo-

• Accordingly, this article establishes a new privilege that grants
patients of psychotherapists a privilege
much broader in scope that the
ordinary physician-patient privilege.
Although it is recognized that the
granting of the privilege may operate

tient or research subject is assured that

make the full disclosure upon which diagnosis and treatment or complete and
accurate research depends.

the relationship by safeguarding the confidential disclosures of the client and the
advice given by the attorney supports a
liberal construction in favor of the exercise of the privilege.
In Cabral, the court reasoned that the
appellant was attempting to establish the
existence of the psychotherapist-patient
relationship, therefore, it narrowly construed Evidence Code Section lOll. Using the "dominant purpose test" the
court concluded that the letter was not

"for the purpose of securing a diagnosis
or ... treatment of his mental or emotional
29
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condition ... " Evidence Code Section
lOll.
Appellant's asserted purpose in writing to Dr. Johnson, i.e., to avoid prison
sentence, was not protected under 1014.
Moreover, nowhere in his testimony
does appellant suggest that even part of
his purpose was to receive treatment.
Assuming arguendo that, implicitly, part
of appellant's purpose in writing to Dr.
Johnson was to obtain treatment, we cannot conclude that appellant has met his
burden in establishing that it was his
dominant purpose. 12 Cal. App. 4th 827,
15 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 870.
People v. Stritzinger (1983) 34 Cal. 3d
505, 194 Cal. Rptr.431,668P. 2d 738,lnre:
Lifschutz (1970) 2 Cal. 3d 415, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 829, 467 P.2d 557.
Evidence Code Section 1012 defines a
confidential communication as:
Information, including information
obtained by an examination of the
patient, transmitted between a patient and his psychotherapist in the
course of that relationship and in
confidence by a means which, so far
as the patient is aware, discloses the
information to no third persons
other than those who are present to
further the interest of the patient in
the consultation, or those to whom
disclosure is reasonably necessary
for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the
purpose for which the psychotherapist is consulted, and includes a diagnosis made and the advice given
by the psychotherapist in the course
of that relationship.
In People v. Henderson (1977)19 Cal.
3d 86, 97, 98, 137 Cal. Rptr. 1, 560 P.2d
1180, a criminal defendant claimed that
the trial court erred in admitting evidence of statements that he made to a
psychotherapist who interviewed him
whIle he was in jail. Rejecting hiscontention that these statements were protected
by the psychotherapist-patient privilege,
the California Supreme Court stated:

Immediately prior to his interview
with Dr. Griswold, Henderson was
advised that he had a right to remain
silent, that anything he said could be
used against him and that he had the
right to have his attorney present.
He was then asked, "Having in
30

mind and understanding your
rights ... are you willing to talk with
Dr. Griswold?" He responded,
"Yes, I will." In addition, Dr.
Griswold informed Henderson that
the interview was being conducted
at the request of the district attorney.

•••
These facts amply support the trial
court's determination that Henderson's
statements to Dr. Griswold were voluntarily made under circumstances devoid
of the confidentiality fundamental to an
assertion of the patient-psychotherapist
privilege. We find no error. [Id. at 97-981
In Re: Edward D. (1976) 61 Cal.
App.3d 10, 132 Cal. Rptr. 100, was a proceeding under the Welfare and Institutions Code Section 600 to bring two minor boys under the control of the juvenile
court. The Department of Social Services
referred the boys' mother to a psychologist for an evaluation. At the hearing, the
court permitted the psychologist to testify over the mother's objection that this
testimony was privileged. The court of
appeal held:
The record shows ... that appellant
understood that she was to be examined by Dr. Cramer to provide a diagnosis or evaluation which would
be considered in determining
whether she would be given custody. She knew that the juvenile
court judge was the one who would
make that decision... thus, while the
information remained confidential
as between appellant and the world
generally, the transmission of the
information to the juvenile court
judge was proper in order to accomplish her purpose. 61 Cal. App.3d at
15.
The court went on to conclude:
The necessary implication is that an
examination may be made in confidence for a particular purpose, and
that a communication made for the
accomplishment of that purpose
neither breaches the confidence nor
destroys the privilege. 61 Cal.
App,3d at 15.

The psychotherapist-patient privi-

lege is construed liberally in favor of the
patient and his right to privacy, which
includes a general right not to disclose
information about treatment for mental
or emotional problems. Because of the
nature of the practice of a psychotherapist, the mere disclosure of the existence
of the relationship reveals, at least in a
general sense, the nature of the problems
and gives rise to the inference of mental
or emotional problems. Therefore, the
fact of the existence of the relationship
must be privileged as well. For this reason, mere disclosure of the patient's
identity is held to violate this privilege.
Smith v Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.
App.3d 136, 173 Cal. Rptr. 145, Scull v.
Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal. App.3d
784,254 Cal. Rptr. 24.
There is the added consideration that
the harm of disclosure of a relationship
with a psychotherapist is greater than
disclosures of other relationships, due to
the stigma that society often attaches to
mental illness. Scull v. Superior Court
(1988) 206 Cal. App. 3d at 789.
In Scull v. Superior Court (1988) 206
Cal. App.3d 784, 254 Cal. Rptr. 24. the
defendant, a psychiatrist, was charged
with sexually molesting a teenaged patient. The district attorney moved for disclosure of the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of the defendant's female patients over the past ten years in
order to contact them to determine
whether any of them had been abused or
molested by him. The court recognized a
need to balance the need for the disclosure against any encroachment on the
patient's fundamental right to privacy.
The court in Scull found that the
government's proffered use of the evidence was "insufficient to over come the
patients righttoconfidentiality" and that
there were other, less intrusive ways to
obtain this information". 206 Cal.
App.3d at 792.
In reviewing the scope of the psychotherapist-patient privilege the court obseIVed:
"Evidence Code Section 1014... affords a broad privilege that prevents
the disclosure of communications
made between a patient and a psychotherapist. 206 Cal. App.3d at 788.

•••
The disclosure that an individual is
2nd & 3rd Quarters, 1994
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seeing a therapist may well serve to discourage any treatment and thereby interfere with the patien~s freedom to seek
and derive the benefits of psychotherapy... 'The patients purpose would
be inhibited and frustrated if his psychotherapist could be compelled to give up
his identity without his consent. 206 Cal.
App.3d at 788.
The court also held that even if the
government could show that their need
for the disclosure was sufficiently compelling, they had failed to demonstrate
that the potential benefits of <:pntacting
the patients would outweigh the harm
caused by the intrusion. The court noted
the myriad of trauma and embarrassment that could be caused by persons
who may be already emotionally
troubled.
The result would be that those in need
of psychotherapy may be discouraged
by fear of disclosure from seeking the aid
of psychotherapists, and those who have
been cured may be needlessly harmed.
Under the circumstances which have
been presented, there is no permissible
exception to the patient-psychotherapist
privilege that compels the disclosure of
the names of petitioners former patients.
206 Cal. App. 3d at 794.
The Legislate Committee Comment
to Evidence Code section 912 states in
pertinent part:
Subdivision (d) is designed to maintain the confidentiality of communications in certain situations where
the communications are disclosed to
others in the course of accomplishing the purpose for which the lawyer, phYSician, or psychotherapist
was consulted. Nor would a
physician's or psychotherapist's
keeping of confidential records necessary to diagnose or treat a patient,
such as confidential hospital
records, be a waiver of the privilege,
even though other authorized persons have access to the records.
Similarly, the patien~s presentation
of a physician's prescription to a
registered pharmacist would not
constitute a waiver of the physidanpatient privilege because such disclosure is reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose
for which the physicianisconsulted.
See also Evidence Code § 992.

DEFENDER

203 Cal. App. 3d 521, 527, 528, 250 Cal.
Rptr. 25, a witness's communications
with other participants in a group
therapy session were held to be within
the psychotherapist-patient privilege.
The court stated:
In our view, the other participants in
a group therapy session are those
who are present to further the interest of the patient in the consultation
... or the accomplishment of the
purpose for which the psychotherapist is consulted. [citation omitted]
The language of Evidence Code section 1012 plainly indicates that communications made by patients to
persons who are present to further
the interests of the patient comes
within the privilege. "Group
therapy" is designed to provide
comfort and revelation to the patient who shares similar experiences
and or difficulties with other like
persons in the group. The presence
of each person is for the benefit of
the others including the witness/
patient, and is d~igned to facilitate
the patient's treatment. Communications such as these, when made in
confidence, should not operate to
destroy the privilege.
In Luhdorff v. Superior Court (1985)
166 Cal. App. 3d 485, 490, 492, 212 Cal.
Rptr. 516, the trial court issued a discovery order allowing the prosecution to
discover records relating to conversations that a criminal defendant had with
a clinical social worker (Gramajo) at a
mental health clinic. The appellate court
vacated the discovery order. It held that
although the social worker was not
within the statutory definition of "psychotherapist" the communications were
privileged because they were necessary
for the transmission of information to the
psychologists and psychotherapists who
supervised the clinic, and the accomplishment of the purpose for which the
psychotherapeutic services were sought:

Here, although Gramajo was not a
therapist to whom the privilege attached, he worked under such a person generally, and petitioner's case
was ultimately controlled and supervised by persons to whom the
privilege attached. Gramajo testified he initially interviewed clients

looking for reactions and behaviors
in order to devise a fldiagnosis and a
treatment plan." The treatment
plan was then approved by his supervisor, Dr. Smith, a licensed clinical psychologist, or by a center psychiatrist. Gramajo needed their approval to implement his treatment
plan.

Dr. Smith testified he read Gramajo's
admission summaries and progress
notes and met with him at least weekly to
discuss cases, to advise as to procedures
and to evaluate Gramajo's performance.
Dr. Smith approved all treatment plans
and occasionally made suggestions as to
changes. Gramajo worked with Dr.
Smith and a health services psychiatrist
in a team effort for all patients. Gramajo
was responsible and usually would do
only individual counseling, while medical treatment of a patient was controlled
by a psychiatrist at the health center.
Gramajo clearly falls within the category of persons reasonably necessary
for the transmission of information or the
accomplishment of the purpose for
which the psychotherapist is consulted.
In Grosslight v. Superior Court (1977)
72 Cal. App. 3d 502, 506, 508, 140 Cal.
Rptr. 278, the parents of a 16-year-old girl
were sued in a personal injury action on
the theory that they had failed to exercise
adequate parental control over her despite knowledge of her propensity for
violence. The plaintiff sought disclosure
of the girl's psychiatric records on the
theory that the records might contain
some statements by the parents showing
knowledge of the daughter's condition.
The court held that communications between the parents and the psychiatrist
were protected regardless of whether
they were a means of transmitting information or facilitating the transmission of
information to or from the daughter.
In the case at bar there is a factual
showing that the communication (if any)
between the parents and hospital personnel is to further the child's interest in
communication with a psychiatrist or
with psychiatric personnel or that it was
necessary for the transmission of information to the psychotherapist. However, such communications between parent and hospital are for the purpose of
furthering the child's interest in communicating with the psychotherapist and
are to facilitate the diagnosis and treat-

In Farrell 1.. v. Superior Court (1988)
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ment of the child.[Id. at 506]

•••
Applying the rule of liberal construction and the underlying policy of section
1014 as above quoted, we hold that the
privilege established by the section in-
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PSYCHOTHERAPIST.pAnENT PRIVILEGE

Any exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege must be construed
narrowly. People v. Stritzinger (1983) 34
Cal. 3d 505,513, 194 Cal. Rptr. 431, 668P.
2d 738, People v. Iohn B., (1987) 192 Cal.
App. 3d 1073, 1077, 237 Cal. Rptr. 659.

cludes all relevant communications to

psychotherapists and to psychiatric personnel by intimate family members of
the patient. [Id. at 508]
The Court in Re: Lifschutz (1970) 2
Cal. 3d 415, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829 made clear
that the psychotherapist-patient privilege is not absolute in stating, "Even
though a patient's interest in the confidentiality of the psychotherapist-patient
relationship rests, in part, on constitutional underpinnings, all state "interference with such confidentiality is not prohibited. 2 Cal. 3d at 432. The burden,
rests with the party seeking to introduce
the evidence which is claimed to be privileged, to demonstrate thatit falls outside
the scope of the privilege.
In Scull v. Superior Court (1988) 206
Cal. App.3d 784, 254 Cal. Rptr. 24 the
government sought disclosure of the
names of the former patients of the defendant who was charged with sexually
molesting teen-age patients. The court
issued a writ of mandate holding that the
trial court erred· in ordering the disclosure and held:
When the right to disclosure clashes
with a privilege, the court is required to
'indulge in a careful balancing of the
need for disclosure against the fundamental right of privacy.

...

We find the proffered use of the evidence sought by the prosecution to be
insufficient to overcome the patients
right to confidentiaJity.

...

The evidence being presently sought
might be obtained by less intrusive
means than [disclosure of the names of
the patients]. ... An order for discovery

that advances a compelling state purpose
ever so slightly, while causing significant
hann to the privacy interests of others, is
not acceptable. 206 Cal. App.3d at 790,
792,794.

[AI Matt... -.lng directly on the
emotional or mental condition of the
defendant voluntully dlscl_ by
patient.

The Senate Committee on Judiciary
Comment following Evidence Code Section 1014 states:
Although the psychotherapist-patient privilege applies in criminal
proceedings, the privilege is not
available to a defendant who puts
his mental or emotional condition in
issue, as, for example, by a plea of
insanity or a claim of diminished

responsibility. See Evidence Code
sections 1016 and 1023. In such a
proceeding, the trier of fact should
have available to it all information

that can be obtained in tegard to the
defendant's mental or emotional
condition. That evidence can often

be furnished by the psychotherapist
who examined the patient-defen-

dant.
The psychotherapist-patient privilege does not apply to any communication which is relevant to an issue which is
raised by the patient during the trial. This
exception is narrowly construed and applies only to disclosures of information

which bear directly on the specific emotional or mental condition which the patient has voluntarily initiated and dis-

closed in the case.
This includes when a defendant en-

ters a plea of "not guilty by reason of insanity" and asks the trier of fact to find
that he was insane at the time of the commission of the offense. In these cases, the
government has the right to have the
court appoint an expert to examine the

defendant and be prepared to testify at
trial. The defense will not be able to exclude this evidence on the grounds that it

is privileged.
If the trial is bifurcated, with a separate trial on the question of guilt from the
trial on the question of sanity, the testimony from the experts is not admissible

during the guilt phase. If the government
seeks to introduce the evidence at that
time, the defense should object that it is
privileged and not relevant to the issues

raised on the question of guilt. The defense should also object that the testimony violates the defendants constitutional right against self-incrimination
since the communications by the defendant provide at least part of the basis for

the opinion.]
In In Re Lifschutz (1970) 2 Cal. 3d 415,
431,435,85 Cal. Rptr. 829, 467 P.2d 557, a
psychiatrist was deposed in an action in
which the plaintiff, his patient, sought,
among other things, damages for severe
mental and emotional suffering alleg-

edly resulting from an assault. When he
refused to reveal whether he had seen the
plaintiff or had any records relating to
plaintiff, he was held in contempt by the
trial court. The California Supreme

Court held that the trial court properly
adjudged the psychiatrist in contempt.
In order to avoid further proceedings, it

also undertook to determine the scope of
the patient-litigant exception:
As we explain more fully below, the
patient-litigant exception allows only a
limited inquiry into the confidences of

the psychotherapist-patient relationship,
compelling disclosure of only those matters directly relevant to the nature of the
specific"emotional or mental" condition

which the plaintiff has voluntarily disclosed and tendered in his pleading or in
answer to discovery inquiries.

...

[T]he "automatic" walverof privilege
contemplated by section 1016 must be
construed not as a complete waiver of the
privilege but only as a limited waiver
concomitant with the purposes of the

exception. Under section 1016 disclosure
can be compelled only with respect to
those mental conditions the patient has
disclosed . .. by bringing an action in
which they are in issue" [citation omitted]; communications which are not directly relevant to those specific conditions do not fall within the terms of section 1016's exception and therefore remain privileged. Disclosure cannot be
II

compelled with respect to other aspects
of the patient-litigan(s personality even
though they may, in some sense, be relevant to the substantive issues of litiga-

tion. The patient thus is not obligated to

IV. EXCEPTIONS TO THE
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sacrifice all privacy to seek redress of a
specific mental or emotional injury; the
scope of the inquiry permitted depends
on the nature of the injuries which the
patient-litigant himself has brought before the court.
In People v. Mickle (1991) 54 Cal. 3d
140,284 Cal. Rptr.511, the defendant was
convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death. On appeal ofthe penalty
phase the defendant revealed his psychiatric history during direct examination.
At the end of direct examination the
prosecution sought immediate access to
all of defendant's hospital records. Defendant claimed that he had not tendered
his mental condition within the meaning
of the "patient-litigant" exception. EvidenceCodeSection 1014, 1016. Nonethe. less, the California Supreme Court held
that the exception applied.
Defendant broadly argues that the
court erred in "fail(ingJtoplaceany limitation" on prosecutorial access to the
records. The documents are not included
in the appellate record, and defendant
does not describe their content.

•••
Defendant essentially claimed that
mental problems had prompted his admission into (a psychiatric hospitalJ as an
arrestee in this case. He also accused (another psychiatric hospitalJ of professional malpractice, but suggested he had
nonetheless adjusted well (there]. The
court did not err in concluding that defendant had waived the privilege insofar
as it might otherwise apply to recorded
information about his condition, treatment, and performance at these institutions. 54 Cal.3d 190
The court relied on In re Lifschutz and
noted:
The exception recognizes that it
would be unfair to allow the patient
to describe"a t length to the jury in a
crowded courtroom the details of
his supposed ailment, and then
neatly suppress the available proof
of his falsities by wielding a
weapon, nOminally termed a privilege". 54 Cal. 3d at 190.
In Re Spencer(I965) 63 Cal. 2d 400,46
Cal. Rptr. 753, 406 P. 2d 33, the defendant
was convicted of first degree murder and
robbery and sentenced to death. He filed
Volume 6, Number 2 & 3
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a writ of habeas corpus before the California Supreme Court and alleged that
the court erred in allowing the testimony
of a court appointed psychiatrist during
the guilt phase of the trial. The court denied the writ as to the guilt phase of the
trial and held that it is proper to admit the
testimony of a court appointed psychiatrist during the guilt phase of the trial
once the defendant has placed his mental
condition at issue with the defense of diminished capacity or insanity. (The writ
was granted as to the penalty phase on
other issues). The court set out three conditions which would insure the protection of the defendant's constitutional
rights:
(IJ"before submitting to an examination by court appointed psychiatrists, a
defendant must be represented by counsel or intelligently and knowingly have
waived that right. Defendant's counsel
must be informed as to the appointment
of the psychiatrists."
(2J ''If after submitting to an examination, a defendant does not specifically
place his mental copdition at issue at the
guilt trial, then the court-appointed psychiatrist should not be permitted to testify at the guilt trial."
(3J"If defendant does specifically
place his mental condition into issue at
the guilt trial, then the court appointed
psychiatrist should be permitted to testify at the guilt trial, but the court should
instruct the jurors that the psychiatrists
testimony as to the defendant's incriminating statements should not be regarded as proof of the truth of the facts
disclosed by such statements and that
such evidence may be considered only
for the limited purpose of showing the
information upon which the psychiatrist
based his opinion." 63 Cal. 2d at 412.

Finally, the court observed that when
the trial court makes a determination as
to whether the defendant has placed his
mental condition at issue, it is not sufficient if the defendant has merely entered
a plea of "not guilty" and is contesting
his/her guilt on the charge. Rather the
court must find that the defense has presented a defense such as "diminished
capacity", or epilepsy and has directly
placed his mental condition at issue. In
Re: Spencer 63 Cal. 2d at 412, fn.lO.

In People v. Danis (1973) 31 Cal.
App.3d 782, 107 Cal. Rptr. 675 the defendant raised a defense of diminished capacity for the charge of auto theft. After
the defense presented psychiatric testimony in support of the defense, the government moved to have the defendant
examined by a psychiatrist and presented that doctors testimony in rebuttal.
The court applied the test set forth in
Spencer and found that this defendant
had placed his mental condition at issue
and had therefore waived any objection
to a court appointed psychiatrist testifying on the issue of diminished capacity.
The trial court in Danis also took the additional precaution and "specifically
prohibited (the doctor] from testifying to
any incriminating statements made by
the defendant during the examination".
31. Cal. App. 3d at 785.
IBI Pay_therapist appointed by Older
of the court

The privilege does not apply to communications made to a doctor appointed
by the court or Board of Prisons.
Evidence Code Section 1017 provides
an exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege whene the psychotherapist
is appointed by order of the court to examine someone. These appointments are
authorized under Evidence Code Sections 730-733, (Appointment of Expert by
Court, Payment of Court Appointed Expert, and Calling, Examining court appointed expert, Right to Produce other
expert Testimony); Penal Code Section
1027 (insanity plea) and Welfare and Institutions Code Section 7107 (sex offenders). However, if the defense requests the
court to appoint an expert to assist in the
preparation of the defense, then the psychotherapist-patient privilege will apply. The comment to Evidence Code section 1017 recognizes that the confidentiality must remain intact in such a situation in case the defendant decides not to
proceed with a defense that places his
mental or emotional condition in issue. If
the defense does decide to place his mental state at issue, the patient-litigant exception may apply and any communications made to the psychotherapist which
are relevant to the issue raised may be
admissible at the trial. Evidence Code
Section 1016.
Defense counsel should be alert to the
fact that in certain instances the attomeyclient privilege may protect certain com33
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munications that are not protected
within the psychotherapist-patient privilege. People v. Lines (I975) 13 Cal. 3d 500,
119 Cal. Rptr. 225,531 P.2d 793,Peoplev.
Goldbach (I972) 27 Cal. App. 3d 563, 103
Cal. Rptr. 800.
In People v. Lines (1975) 13 Cal. 3d
500,119 Cal. Rptr. 225, 531 P.2d 793, the
defendant entered a plea of not guilty by
reason of insanity and had a bifurcated
trial, one phase on the issue of guilt and
the second phase on the issue of s.anity.
At the sanity phase, the government
called two doctors who had previously
been appointed under Evidence Code
730 and 1017 to examine the defendant
and prepare confidential reports. The
defense objected arguing that this testimony violated the attorney-client privilege. The California Supreme Court
agreed. The court stated:
The doctors were appointed by the
court for the purpose of examining the
defendant for his own benefit and of
fully informing his counsel as to the nature and extent of defendant's mental
condition to the end of assisting counsel
in the preparation and presentation of a
defense. All information obtained by the
doctors from their examination of the
defendant and the reports thereof furnished to his attorney constituted confidential communications protected. from
disclosure by the attorney-client privilege. The fact that the psychiatrists were
appointed by the court rather than privately employed by counsel in no way
affects the confidentiality of these communications ... " 13 Cal. 3d at 510.
[n Re: Eduardo A. (1989) 209 Cal.
App. 3d 1038, 261 Cal. Rptr,68, involved
a proceeding under the Welfare and Institutions Code section 387 to detennine
whether the children should be removed
from the mother's custody. The mother
had allowed the father to have contact
with the children in violation of a previous court order. At the hearing, the
mother's therapist was called as a witness. The trial court upheld the mother's
claim that the testimony involving her
confidential communications with the
therapist were privileged and the California Supreme court agreed. The court
held that fact that the mother was referred to this doctor by the juvenile court
did not make him "appointed by the
court" within the meaning of Evidence
Code section 1017 and therefore no exception applied. The court explained the
34
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distinction:
A juvenile court's referral of a parent
for counseling after a finding that the
children had been molested is obviously
consistent with [providing protection to
the children and the preservation of the
family]. The purpose of such counseling
is to assist the parent in understanding
the problem and preventing its recurrence, thereby protecting the children
and attempting to preserve the family
structure.
In contrast, a court ordered psychiatric examination is aimed at determining
for the information of the patient and \or
for the court, the patient's mental and
emotional condition. It is an information
gathering tool, rather than a treatment
tool. The exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege in Evidence Code
Section 1017 is directed toward this latter, information gathering examination.
We find no basis for broadening this exception to encompass the very different
situation of court ordered counseling.
This narrow view of the privilege exception is consistent with the general rule
that the statutory psychother~pist-pa
tient privilege is to be liberally construed
in favor of the patient. (citation omitted)
209 Cal. App. 3d at 1041-1042.

[CI _ProceMlng Initiated at the request
of the defendant to determine his
sanity, competence, or punishment

Evidence Code section 1023 sets for
an exception to the privilege when there
is a proceeding. initiated at the request of
the defendant to determine his sanity to
be tried, sentenced or punished. The procedure for this hearing is set forth in Penal Code Sections 1367 - 1375.5. This proceeding is separate from the plea of "not
guilty by reason of insanity" which may
be entered by a defendant and results in
a separate trial on the issue of sanity.
Since in the latter case the defendant is
introducing his mental state into issue,
the "patient-litigant" exception to the
privilege would govern those issues.
Evidence Code Section 1016.

of_

[D) Communication made In aid
commission of a crtme or tort or to
escape apprehension lifter the
commission of a crime or a tort.

Evidence Code Section 1018 sets forth
the "tort/crime" exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege. The Law
Revision Commission Comment to evidence code Section 1018 referts to the

Comment to Evidence Code Section 997
which states:
This section is considerably broader
in scope than section 956 which provides
that the lawyer client privilege does not
apply when the communication was
made to enable anyone to commit or plan
to commit a crime or fraud. Section 997
creates an exception to the physician patient privilege where the services of the
physician were sought or obtained to
enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to
commit a crime or tort, or to escape detection or apprehension after commission of
a crime or tort.
[E) Dangerous person exception

The privilege does not apply if the
psychotherapist has reasonable cause to
believe that the patient will be a danger
to himself or others.
Under Evidence Code Section 1024, a
confidential communication between a
psychotherapist and a patient are not
privileged if the psychotherapist has reasonable cause to believe that the patient
is in a mental or emotional condition
such that 1) he is dangerous to himself or
to the person or property of another, and
2) that disclosure of the communication
is necessary to prevent the threatened
danger.
The Law revision Commission Comment explains the balance in applying
this exception in stating:
Although this exception might inhibit the relationship between the
patient and his psychotherapist to a
limited extent, it is essential that appropriate action be taken if the psychotherapist becomes convinced
during the course of treatment that
the patient is a menace to himself or
others and the patient refuses to permit the psychotherapist to make the
disclosure necessary to prevent the
threatened danger.
The Comment also notes that this exception to the psychotherapist-patient
privilege is narrower than the comparable exception provided in the marital
communications privilege (Evidence
Code Section 982) and the physician-patient privilege. (Evidence code Section
1004).
In Peoplev. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal. 3d

522,280 Cal. Rptr. 631, the California
Supreme Court found that the substance
2nd & 3rd Quarters, 1994
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of a psychotherapisfs warning to a potential victim of danger posed by the defendant and the defendant's statements
made in therapy which triggered a warning fell within the psychotherapist-patient privilege. The court held that a patient does not involuntarily waive the
psychotherapist-patient privilege for all
statements and all purposes merely because some of the patient's statements
made in therapy justified disclosure in
the form of a warning to the victim.
We agree that the mere fact that some
statements are non privileged by operation of section 1024 does not automatically make all of the defendant's confidential communication to his therapist
available to the prosecution. 53 Cal. 3d.
at 649.
In People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal. 3d.
583,268 Cal. Rprt. 399, a criminal
defendant's threats to kill or to have
killed may have fallen within the "da,ngerous patienf' exception, but the court
opined that it did not need to resolve this
issue "because at the time of trial [the
psychotherapist] had already revealed
the communications that were [confidential], therefore they were no longer
confidential" .
The question is not whether the psychotherapist-patient privilege has been
waived or the (dangerous patient exception] applies, but whether the privilege
may be claimed. at all once the communication is no longer confidential. Whether
the psychotherapist "reasonably believes" that the revelation of the communication is necessary also becomes irrelevant once the communication has lost
its confidential status. The reasons for
the privilege-protecting and promoting
the therapeutic relationship-and thus the
privilege itself, disappear once the communication is no longer confidential.[Id
at 620J.
In Menendez v. Superior Court of Los
Angeles (1992) 3 Cal. 4th 435, 11 Cal.
Rprt. 2d 92, the California Supreme
Court clarified its holding in Clark.
Menendez. stated that Clark must not be
broadly interpreted so as to require that
the communication be and remain confidential in order to be privileged.
Clark holds oniy that when a psychotherapist discloses a patient's threat to
the patient's intended victim ... the disclosed threat is not covered by the privilege.
The privilege can cover a communica-

•
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tion that was never, in fact, "confidential" - so long as it was made in confidence. The communication need only
comprise of "information ... transmitted
between a patient and his psychotherapist in the course of that relationship and
in confidence by a means, which, so far as
the patient is aware discloses the information" to no "outside" third person
(Evidence Code Section 1012) ... Similarly
the privilege can cover a communication
that has lost its "confidential status". 3
Cal. 4th at 447.
Tn Menendez, a psychologist's
audiotaped notes of his session with defendants, Erik and Lyle Menendez, were
admissible because they fell within the
dangerous-patient exception. The brothers had made threats of harm that were
not only aimed at the psychologist, Dr.
Oziel, but also at his wife, Laurel Oziel,
and his lover, Iudalon Smyth.
The defense sought to keep the tapes
excluded from trial but the superior
court rejected their claim that they were
protected under the psychotherapist-patient privilege. The Menendez brothers
filed a petition for writ of mandate and/
or prohibition in the Court of Appeal that
was summarily denied. The California
Supreme Court granted review and
transferred the matter to the Court of
Appeal with direction to vacate its summary denial and cause an alternative
writ to issue. The Court of Appeal again
denied the petition. Subsequently, the
California Supreme Court handed down
its decision in Wharton and thus granted
review of the Menendez petition.
In light of Wharton the court looked at
the audiotapes and each session separately. One of the audiotapes contained
Dr. Oziel's notes relating to two sessions
with both of the Menendez brothers; one
contained Dr. Oziel's notes from one session with Erik; and one contained an actual session conducted with Lyle and
Erik.
With regard to portion of the tape
containing Dr. Oziel's notes of his October 31 session the court noted that at the
outset the psychotherapist-patient privilege was available. The court found it
irrelevant that a third party, Iudalon
Smyth, overheard some of the communications as an eavesdropper, and that the
communications lost their confidential
status through disclosure to the potential
victims and through Smyth's subsequent
dissemination.

The notes reflect the "confidential
communication[s] between patient[s]
and psychotherapist" (Evidence Code
Section 1014). "transmitted" .. .in the
course of [the psychotherapeutic] relationship and in confidence by a means
which, so far as [Lyle and Erik] [were]
aware, disclose[d] information to not
"outside" third person.
The court also found that the "dan-

gerous-patient" exception was applicable to this portion of the tape. Prior to
this particular session, Erik had revealed
in detail to Dr. Oziel the planning and
execution of the murder of Jose and Mary
Louise Menendez. After Lyle found out

about his brother's confession Dr. Oziel' s
notes reflect that Lyle was "very, very
unhappy and now would have to think
about whatto do with this situation." Dr.
Oziel "clearly was getting the message
that...Lyle was telling me that he was
considering killing me, and .. .it was very
clear from Erik that Erik had the same
feeling". 7 Cal. App. 4th 147, 153, 279
Cal. Rptr. 521, 524.
"[The dangerous-patient exception]
conditions were met: Dr. Oziel had reasonable cause to believe that Lyle and
Erik were dangerous to himself directly
and to Laurel Oziel and Iudalon Smyth
collaterally, and that disclosure to the
two women was necessary to prevent
any harm".
The superior court.. .impliedly recognized that the "reasonableness" of the
requisite "reasonable cause to believe"
must be determined in light of the standards of the psychotherapeutic community. The test is objective, but takes account of all the relevant circumstances; it
is based on the norms prevailing among
psychotherapists as a group, but allows
broad.discretion to the individual psychotherapist. In certain cases, expert testimony as to the relevant standards may
be necessary. Here, it was not: the evidence all but compelled the conclusion of
"reasonableness". In any event, expert
testimony bearing on the standards was,
in fact, presented by Dr. Oziel himself.
Dr. Oziel disclosed to Laurel Oziel
and Judalon Smyth, in separate warnings against any collateral harm, all the
communication made at this session and
reflected. on audiotape, having reasonable cause to believe that the
Menendezes were dangerous and that
disclosure of these communications was
necessary. 7 CaI.App.4th at 153.
35
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Using the same rationale, the court
found the"dangerous patient" exception

applicable to the portion of the audiotape
containing Dr. Oziers notes of his No-

vember 2 session with Lyle and Erik. At
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cause to believe that disclosure was necessary." Thus there was no "dangerouspatient" exception with regard to this
portion of the audiotape.
Although murders were discussed

this session 'Th. Oziel informed the petitioners that although the session was

during part of the session, the majority of

confidential, they would not be if peti-

of Erik's fear of Lyle ... Dr. Oziel stated in
his notes that he "still continued to feel

tioners threatened Dr. Oziel or anyone

else."
Although by the end of the session Dr.
Oziel was somewhat less fearful, he still
believed that petitioners would have

killed him "were it not for the fact that I
had explained to them that I had notes
kept in a safety deposit box with instructions to reveal them upon my death,"
and that petitioners were "absolutely

capable" of murdering him. 7 Cal. App.
4th at 155.

the session was devoted to a discussion

threatened and to believe that at any
moment if Lyle perceives that in any
way, shape, or form I am capable
of... giving information to anyone, that
Lyle is fully capable of trying to encourage Erik to, or arrange for, my murder or

anyone else's." 7 Cal. App. 4th at 155,
156.
Likewise, the "dangerous patient"
exception did not operate with the portion of the audiotape containing the recording of Dr. Oziel's December 11 session with Lyle and Erik. The court acc~pted

Considering the portion of the audiotape containing Dr. Oziel's notes of his
November 28 session with Erik the court

found that the psychotherapist-patient
privilege was available at the outset.
This finding is contrary to the court of

appeal's conclusion that the purpose of
the session particular to this tape was not

for the purposes of therapy.
The court of appeal's express legal
basis was its belief that "Dr. Oziel was
motivated by self preservation, and [the
Menendezes1 were motivated by self interest" .

•••
In any event, motive is largely, if not
totally, immaterial. It appears that in vir-

the lower court's finding that the

November 28 and December 11 session
"were simply restatementS ... an amplification of similar communications [of earlier sessions]." The court also found that
the "disc1osure-is-necessary requirement was not met as to this session."
In re Kevin F. (1989) 213 Cal. App.3d

178,261 Cal. Rptr. 413, (rehearing denied
10/25/89), Kevin appeals his adjudication on the charge of arson alleging error
in the admission into evidence of a confidential communication to his psychotherapist in which he confessed to a
crime. In November, 1982, Kevin was
committed to a residential program for
an unrelated offense. In February, 1983,
during a mandatory counseling session,

Kevin told his psychotherapist, Hobbs,
that he had stolen money from a house
and then set fire to it even though he

knew that people were inside. Hobbs did

where there is no specific, identifiable
victim. The court explained that the exception to the privilege is written in
broad language and only requires a
showing that the patient, represents a
general threat or danger to the commu-

nity at large. The court distinguished this
showing from that which is required
when a psychotherapist is sued in a civil
case where it is alleged that he /she was

negligent for failing to warn the plaintiff
of the impending danger which the client
posed. In those cases, the court has found
a breach of the psychotherapist's duty
only when there is a readily identifiable
victim to whom the disclosures were
necessary to prevent danger. (Citing

Tarasoff v. Regents of University of Califomia (1976) 17Cal.3d 425, 131 Cal. Rptr.
14,551 P.2d 334.
In People v. Hopkins (1975) 44 Cal.
App. 3d 669, 674, 119 Cal. Rptr. 61, the
defendant was accused of brutally beating an elderly woman in the course of
committing a number of crimes. The
same day, after receiving assurances of

confidentiality, he told a psychiatrist of
his crimes. His motion to suppress a subsequent confession to police on the

ground that it resulted from disclosure of
a confidential psychotherapist-patient
communication was denied. Assuming
that the confession in fact resulted from

the psychiatrist's disclosure of confidential communications, the appellate court

held that the denial of the motion was
nonetheless proper because the trial
court was justified in finding that the
communications were not privileged:
But Hopkins makes no mention in his

briefs of the qualifying Evidence Code
section 1024 which states: "There is no
privilege under this article if the psychotherapist has reasonable cause to believe
that the patient is in such mental oremotiona I condition as to be dangerous to

tually all psychotherapy, what motivates
the participants is not psychotherapy for
its own sake. For example, the psycho-

to anyone until June, 1983 when she disclosed it to his probation officer. At trial,

therapist is sometimes motivated by selfinterest, as when he earns his living

der Evidence Code Section 1024, the

himself or to the person or property of

solely through his practice. For his part,

"dangerous patient" exception to the

the patient is sometimes motivated by
self-preservation, as when he struggles
to resist the temptation of suicide or antisocial conduct. As a general matter, the
dispositive fact is what the participants

psychotherapist-patient privilege.
The court of appeal found there was
sufficient evidence for the finding of dan-

another and that disclosure of the communication is necessary to prevent the

do, not why. 3 Cal. 4th at 454.

not record this conversation or report it

the court admitted these statements un-

gerousness including the fact that Kevin
was not responding to treatment, that he
was fascinated with fire, and he was sus-

pected of setting a fire at the program.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court con-
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The court In Kevin F. also held that
Evidence Code Section 1024applies even

cluded that "evidence was insufficient to

The court did not address the doctors
failure to disclose this information for

establish that Dr. Oziel had reasonable

such a long period of time.

threatened danger." In its January 1965
official comment to the then proposed

Evidence Code section 1024, the Call1ornia Law Revision Commission stated:

"Although this exception might inhibit
the relationship between the patient and
the psychiatrist to a limited extent, it is
essential that appropriate action betaken
if the psychotherapist becomes con2nd & 3rd Quarters, 1994
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vinced during the course of the treatment
that the patient is a menace to himself or
others and the patient refuses to permit
the psychiatrist to make the disclosure

N

covery motion and remanded the case
with directions to redetermine the mo-

this exception does not apply where the
doctor is the person who is deemed to be

tion. In doing so, it rejected the defendants' contention that the dangerous
patient exception established by Evidence Code section 1024 did not apply
because the patient no longer presented
a danger to the plaintiffs:
A literal reading of Evidence Code

necessary to prevent the threatened dan-

dangerous. In such a case, the privilege

still belongs to the patient, and there is no
basis to preclude that patient from asserting his/her privilege. Scull v. Superior
Court (1988) 206 Cal. App.3d 784, 793,
254 Cal. Rptr. 24.J
The dangerous patient exception to the
psychotherapist-patient privilege contin-

From the evidence the trial court rea-

DER

others does not allow the patient to take
advantage of the privilege. However,

ger."

•••

section 1024 would limit its provisions to

ues even after the danger ceases to exist.

a prospective application. Both the language of the statute and the Law Revision Commission Comment speak in

himself or to the person or property of

In People v. Gomez (1982) 134 Cal.
App. 3d 874, 881, 185 Cal. Rptr. 155, the

terms of "threatened danger." There is
authority, however, for a retrospective

another and that disclosure of the communication [was] necessary to prevent

defendant was convicted of murder. The
trial court permitted two intern psy-

application of that section.
Though the disclosure at trial was no

the threatened danger."

chologists to testify that the defendant
had told them he intended to kiil the vic-

sonably concluded that the psychotherapist had reasonable cause to believe that
Hopkins was "in such mental or emotional condition as to be dangerous to

Under the circumstances Hopkins
held no privilege under Evidence Code
section 1014. The trial court did not err in

would otherwise be within the scope of

denying the motion to suppress. [Id. 674J

the psychotherapist-patient privilege,

In Luhdorff v. Superior Coun
(1985) 166Cal. App.3d 485, 212 Cal. Rptr.
516, the defendant was charged with,
inter alia. burglary, kidnapping and
rape. The district attorney filed a motion
for discovery of communications be-

tween the defendant and a clinical social
worker. The trial court granted the mo-

tion finding that the communications did
not fall within the privilege, and if they
did they could be disclosed under the

tim. Assuming that these statements

the appellate court held that they were
not privileged by virtue of the dangerous
patient exception established by Evidence Code section 1024. In reaching its

may determine the applicability of the

cable at the time of trial because there
was no longer any danger to the victim:
Defendant's theory, again assuming
that the communications to the students

were privileged, is that although no privi-

Code section 1024 provides categorically

covery order. The court held that the

that there "is no privilege" as to certain

communications were privileged and
that the finding of dangerousness was

communications. '11 the preliminary facts
upon which Evidence Code section 1024

not supported by the record.

rests were present at a time prior to the

"Here, there was no evidence presented that petitioner was a danger to
other persons or property. The records

injury complained of, section 1024 prevents any privilege from attaching." [Id at
881]

indicate petitioners suicidal feelings re-

In Mavroudis v . Superior Court
(1980) 102 Cal. App. 3d 594, 603,604, 162

sulted from remorse and guilt; there was
no indication petitioner ever took or was
going to take affirmative steps concern-

ing these feelings ... the clinic did not consider petitioner presently or in the future

to be a danger to himself..." 166 Cal.
App.3d at 494.
Counsel should note this exception
allows for the disclosure of information
or communications where the patient is

deemed to be dangerous. The compelling social policy of preventing harm to
Volume 6, Number 2 & 3

duty enunciated in Tarasoff, the court
exception after the fact. If the preliminary facts upon which Evidence Code
section 1024 rests were present at a time

rected the trial court to set aside its dis-

sought a writ of mandate or prohibition
to prevent discovery of the records. The

nal disclosure. Similarly, in a civil pro-

ceeding in which the plaintiff alleges a
breach of the defendant's therapist's

argumentthatthe exception was inappli-

court of appeal granted the writ and di-

"dangerous person exception". Evi-

longer necessary to prevent threatened

danger, the court in People v. Hopkins,
supra, relied upon section 1024 when the
conditions upon which that section is
predicated existed at the time of the origi-

decision, the court rejected defendant's

lege existed when the threats were made,
the communications became privileged
because by the time of trial, the victim was
dead and "disclosure" was no longer
"necessary to prevent . . . danger." Even
that oontention is without merit. Evidence

denceCodeSection 1024. The defendant

7

DEFE

Cal. Rptr. 724, a suit against a psychiatrist
and other defendants was predicated on

allegations that the psychiatrist had negligently failed to warn the plaintiffs that
a patient posed a danger to them. The
plaintiffs sought discovery of the
psychiatrist's records and, when the trial
court denied their motion to compel production, petitioned the appellate court
for a writ of mandate. The appellate
court vacated the order denying the dis-

prior to the injury complained of, section
1024 prevents any privilege from attaching and the psychiatric records are subject to discovery in the subsequent pro-

ceeding. [Id. at 64J
(F) Patient under ace of ...teen and the
psychotherapist .... reaaon to believe
that he/_ has _ t h e victim of the

crime.

Evidence Code Section 1027 provides
that there is no psychotherapist-patient
privilege when all of the circumstances

set forth exist:
1) the patient is under 16 years of age,

2) the psychotherapist has reasonable
cause to believe that the patient
has been the victim of a crime, and
3) the disclosure of the communica-

tion is in the best interest of the

child.
The Law revision Commission Com-

mentto this section states that this exception is analogous to the"dangerous patient" exception of Evidence Code section 1024. The comment also states that
this exception is necessary to permit dis-
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closure of these communications in a
proceeding in which the commission of
such a crime is the subject of inquiry.
In People v. Caplan (]987) 193 Cal.
App. 3d 543, 238 Cal. Rptr. 478, Caplan
was convicted of several acts involving
sexual abuse of a child, Cindy. Throughout the trial, the defense sought discovery
of Cindy's psychiatric records and the testimony of the three psychotherapists who
treated her before, during and after the

DEFENDER

The court indicated that one of the doctors had filed a report of abuse under Penal Code section 11166. While his report
was allowed into evidence, the court did
not allow the defendant access to the doctors notes, would not allow the defense to
call the doctor as a witness, and foreclosed
any cross examination of Cindy about
statements that she made to the doctor.
The court found this error to be of "constitutional dimension and stated:

complained of sexual abuse. The trial
court denied these requests and found
that Cindy's psychotherapist patient
privilege was paramount. The court of
Appeal found this denial to be error and
remanded the case for the trial court to
review the evidence which was improperly excluded. The trial court was directed
to determine whether the information
would have changed the outcome of the
trial, and if so, to provide a new trial.
The court observed that in deciding
this case there was more involved than
the defendant's constitutional right of
confrontation against the patient's constitutional right of privacy. The court discussed the application of Evidence Code
Section 1027 and stated:

"
"

We view the exception in Evidence
Code Section 1027 as another vehicle through which the psychotherapist who is treating a child under the age of 16 and has some reason to believe that child abuse is
ongoing or has occurred discloses
such information both to satisfy the
mandatory reporting requirements
and to further the best interest of the
child.

***
We thus interpret Evidence Code section 1027 as a limited removal of the
child-patient's privilege and placement
with the psychotherapist who treated the
child at the time the requirements of the
exception were met. The psychotherapist, not the child, is the one who must
claim the privilege by stating that it is not
in the best interest of the child. Such construction balances the competing state
interests of detecting and preventing
child abuse on the one hand and "the
state's interest in facilitating the
ascertainment of truth in connection
with the legal proceedings" 193 Cal.
App. 3d at 556-557.
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[the defendant was "foreclosed
from fully and effectively confronting the major witness against him
about the very statements making
up her complaint. In limiting cross
examination, the court allowed
Cindy, through the people, to invoke a privilege which she no longer
held concerning her statements to
[thedoctorJ.193Cal. App. 3d at 557.
101 Child Abu. . and Neglect Reporting

Act, Penal Code Section 11164-11174.1

To combat child abuse, speciallegtslation has been enacted to require psychotherapists to report to a child protective
agency allknownand suspected instances
of child abuse. Any information which is
so reported is not protected under either
the physician-patient privilege or under
the psychotherapist-patient privilege.
In People v. Stritzinger (1983) 34 Cal.
3d 505, 194 Cal. Rptr. 431,668P. 2d 738 the
psychotherapist reported an incident of
suspected child abuse to the authorities.
After making the report, the doctor met
with the defendant. The police called the
doctor after this meeting and advised him
that he was obligated to report the content
of his conversations with the defendant.
At trial, the defense objected that these
disclosures were privileged. The California Supreme Court agreed. The court establishes the foundations of the psychotherapist-patient privilege and states:
For reasons of policy the psychotherapist-patient privilege has been broadly
construed in favor of the patient. The
privilege has been recognized as an aspect of the patient's constitutional right
to privacy. 34 Cal. 3d at 511.

***
We [recognize] our obligation to construe narrowly any exception to the psychotherapist patient privilege: we must
apply such an exception only when the

patient's case falls squarely within its
ambit. 34 Cal. 3d at 513
The court went on to hold that the
doctor was under no statutory obligation
to make the second report concerning the
same activity unless he had learned of
additional incidents either with the same
child or with other children. However,
he satisfied his requirements under the
statute by making the initial report.
The psychotherapist is not required to
warn the patient that he has a duty to
report child abuse, although there is a
suggestion that a warning should be
given if there is a duty to report additional details after the first session. In
People v. Stritzinger (]983) 34 Cal. 3d
505,513-514, 194 Cal. Rptr. 431, 668P. 2d
738. Even if the psychotherapist warns
the patient at the first session, there is no
obligation to give similar warnings at
subsequent sessions. People v. John B.
(1987) 192 Cal. App. 3d 1073, 1079, 237
Cal. Rptr. 59. Requiring warnings might
undermine a psychotherapists' ability to
provide meaningful therapy to the patient which is harmful to the patient and
to the public. Because repeated warnings
will eviscerate confidentiality, deter
therapy, and frustrate the goal of stopping child abuse, they are not required.
People v. Iohn B. (1987) 192 Cal. App. 3d
at 1078-1079.
The privilege is waived when the patient discloses or consents to disclose a
significant part of the privileged conununication.
The California Supreme Court In Re
Lifschutz (1970) 2 Cal. 3d 415, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 829, 467 P.2d 557, made it clear that
the mere disclosure of the existence of the
psychotherapist-patient relationship
does not reveal a significant part of the
communication and thus does notconstitute a waiver. In addition, a disclosure
simply of the purpose of any psychiatric
treatment does not constitute a significant portion of a communication.
InRe: Fred I: (979) 89 Cal. App. 3d 168,
152 Cal. Rptr. 327, the court found a
waiver by the mother as to any privilege
she may have had as to the testimony of
two psychiatrists who had examined her
children. The mother had signed several
release forms and had previously directed
the doctor to disclose the information to
various state agencies. The court found:
"To the extent that the mother might
have had a privilege ... she waived it by
disclosure or consent to disclose. 89 Cal.
2nd & 3rd Quarters, 1994

